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1. Introduction 
 
The idea of a ‘Non Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment’ (NAIRU) is at the core of 
modern New Keynesian and New Consensus models of monetary policy analysis.
1 In these 
models the NAIRU is determined by structural factors of the labour market, the wage 
bargaining process and the social benefit system. Due to ‘micro-founded’ rigidities, short run 
unemployment determined by the goods market may deviate from long run equilibrium 
unemployment given by the NAIRU. However, New Keynesian and New Consensus models 
suppose a perhaps slow, but stable adjustment mechanism, either through a real balance effect 
or through a monetary policy reaction function. A downward sloping Phillips-curve is valid in 
the short run, but in the long run effective demand and hence monetary policy has no effect on 
the NAIRU and the long run Phillips-curve becomes vertical again. All that monetary policy 
can do, is stabilising output and employment in the short run and stabilising inflation in the 
long run (Fontana/Palacio-Vera 2005).  
 
In the standard model, short run unemployment has no effect on the NAIRU. However, within 
the New Keynesian approach there have been advanced some models in which short run 
unemployment determined by the goods market affects the NAIRU through the phenomenon 
of ‘hysteresis’ (Ball 1999; Blanchard/Summers 1987, 1988). Applying union wage bargaining 
or insider-outsider models, persistent unemployment and an increasing share of long-term 
unemployment in total unemployment with the associated loss of skills and access to firms by 
the long-term unemployed will decrease the pressure of a given rate of unemployment on 
labour unions’ or insiders’ target real wage and hence on nominal wage demands. This 
requires an increasing total rate of unemployment in order to stabilise inflation. The economic 
policy implications of this amended New Keynesian approach are quite straightforward: 
Prevent unemployment in the short run by means of applying appropriate monetary policies 
and reduce the existing NAIRU by means of structural reforms in the labour market and the 
social benefit system. 
 
                                                 
1 See Ball/Mankiw (2002), Blanchard/Katz (1997), Carlin/Soskice (1990: 133-166), Layard/Nickell/Jackman 
(1991: 361-396), Mankiw (2000) and Stiglitz (1997) for New Keynesian discussion of the NAIRU and 
Clarida/Gali/Gertler (1999), McCallum (2001), Meyer (2001) and Walsh (2002) for New Consensus models. 
These models are basically characterised by three equations: 1. An aggregate demand function derived from 
households’ and firms’ optimisation behaviour which relates the output gap inversely to the real interest rate, 2. 
An expectations-augmented Phillips-curve which makes the rate of inflation positively dependent on the output 
gap in the short run, and 3. A central bank reaction function in which the nominal interest rate set by the central 
bank is determined by the equilibrium real interest rate, by the output gap and by the deviation of actual inflation 
from the inflation target (Taylor-rule).    2
Post-Keynesians have reacted differently to the New Keynesian NAIRU approach. On the one 
hand, some have rejected the idea of a NAIRU altogether and have insisted that 
unemployment in the short and in the long run is determined by the principle of effective 
demand (Davidson 1998; Galbraith 1997). On the other hand, in post-Keynesian models the 
cause of persistent inflation is usually attributed to unresolved distribution conflict 
(Arestis/Sawyer 2004: 73-87; Cassetti 2002; Lavoie 1992: 391-421, 2002; Rowthorn 1977; 
Sawyer 2001, 2002). This implies, that, although employment is determined by effective 
demand in the short and in the long run, in every moment in time there may be some sort of 
‘inflation barrier’ (Robinson 1962: 59) for the increase in economic activity. In what follows, 
we attempt to contribute to an integration of a conflicting claims theory of inflation with a 
long run determination of unemployment by effective demand. This will give rise to a post-
Keynesian interpretation of the NAIRU which will allow us to examine its short-run stability 
and long run endogeneity properties. 
 
Within post-Keynesian theory, Sawyer (2001, 2002) has argued that the NAIRU may only be 
a weak attractor for actual unemployment determined by effective demand without analysing 
the stability of the adjustment process in detail. Stockhammer (2004) has investigated the 
stability of the NAIRU, focussing on distribution effects of employment variations - and not 
on inflation effects - within a post-Keynesian distribution and growth model in the tradition of 
Bhaduri/Marglin (1990). He has shown that only in a profit-led growth regime the NAIRU is 
generally stable. Arestis/Sawyer (2004: 73-99) and Sawyer (2001, 2002) have demonstrated 
that the NAIRU will become endogenous to actual unemployment if the long run effects of 
current investment on capital stock and on productivity growth are taken into account. 
Lavoie’s (2004) post-Keynesian amendment of the New Consensus model also relies on a 
positive relation between capital stock growth and productivity growth, and between output 
growth and labour supply, which makes the natural rate of growth and hence the NAIRU 
endogenous to actual growth and actual unemployment.
2
 
Although post-Keynesian models of distribution and growth with conflict inflation, and also 
some modern New Keynesian and New Consensus NAIRU models, explicitly or implicitly 
rely on a credit economy in which credit and the stock of money are endogenous, they do not 
explicitly analyse the implications of debt and costs of debt (interest) on the stability and the 
                                                 
2 Setterfield’s (2004) post-Keynesian extension of the New Consensus model, however, assumes away an 
inflation barrier and hence a NAIRU. He asserts that there is a long run stable relation between the rate of growth 
and the inflation rate, and hence no acceleration of inflation at a certain point.    3
endogeneity of the NAIRU. This is a serious limitation because the effects of accelerating 
inflation or disinflation/deflation on firms’ debt-asset ratio might considerably impact their 
investment decisions, which has already been pointed out by Fisher (1933) and Keynes (1936: 
264). Real debt effects might hence affect the stability of the NAIRU in the short run, and 
might contribute to endogeneity in the long-run. And central banks’ variations in the real 
interest rate, although perhaps effective in the short-run when it comes to putting a halt to 
accelerating inflation, may have long run effects on firms’ costs of production and hence on 
the NAIRU which then might contradict the stabilisation of inflation in the short run (Lavoie 
1992: 402-404). We will address these problems using a monetary extension of a Kaleckian 
model of distribution and growth, as developed in Hein (2006a), and integrating conflict 
inflation and monetary policy interventions into this model. The remainder of the paper is 
structured as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model and derives the goods market 
equilibrium. Section 3 adds distribution conflict and inflation to the model and distinguishes 
the ‘Stable Inflation Rate of Employment’ (SIRE) from the ‘Goods market Equilibrium Rate 
of Employment’ (GERE). In Section 4 the short-run stability of the SIRE is investigated, 
without and with monetary policy interventions affecting the real interest rate, and it is shown 
that the SIRE is not generally stable. In Section 5 the long run effects of variations in the real 
interest rate on the SIRE and the GERE are discussed and the endogeneity problem is 




2. The basic model 
 
We assume a closed economy without economic activity of the state. Under given conditions 
of production, there is just one type of commodity produced that can be used for consumption 
and investment purposes. There is a constant relation between the employed volume of labour 
(L) and real output (Y), i.e. there is no overhead-labour and no technical change, so that we 
get a constant labour-output-ratio and hence constant labour productivity (y). The capital-
potential output-ratio (v), the relation between the real capital stock (K) and potential real 
output (Y
v), is also constant. The capital stock is assumed not to depreciate. The rate of 
capacity utilisation (z) is given by the relation between actual real output and potential real 
output. The basic model can be described by the following equations: 
   4
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Writing w for the nominal wage rate, we assume that firms set prices (p) according to a mark-
up (m) on constant unit labour costs up to full capacity output with the mark-up being 
determined by the degree of price competition in the goods markets and by the relative 
powers of capital and labour in the labour market (equation 1) (Kalecki 1954: 11-27). The 
profit share (h), i.e. the proportion of profits (Π) in nominal output (pY) is therefore 
determined by the mark-up (equation 2). The profit rate (r) relates the annual flow of profits to 
the nominal capital stock (equation 3). 
 
Introducing monetary variables into the model, we follow the post-Keynesian ‘horizontalist’ 
monetary view developed by Kaldor (1970, 1982, 1985), Lavoie (1984, 1992: 149-216, 1996) 
and Moore (1988, 1989) and assume that the interest rate is an exogenous variable for the 
accumulation process whereas the quantities of credit and money are determined   5
endogenously by economic activity.
3 In this view, the central bank controls the base rate of 
interest. Commercial banks set the market rate of interest by marking up the base rate and 
then supply the credit demand of consumers and investors they consider creditworthy at this 
interest rate. The central bank accommodates the necessary amount of cash. For the sake of 
simplicity, in what follows we suppose that the central bank’s nominal interest rate policy 
controls - within certain limits discussed below - the real rate of interest, i.e. the nominal 
interest rate corrected by the inflation rate. We follow Pasinetti’s (1974: 47) recommendation 
to treat the rate of interest as an exogenous variable in the theory of effective demand. 
 
The pace of accumulation is determined by the entrepreneurs’ decisions to invest. We assume 
that long-term investment finance is supplied only by retained earnings or by long-term credit 
of rentiers’ households (directly or through banks).
4 By means of this simplification we do not 
have to distinguish between creditor households receiving interest income, on the one hand, 
and shareholder households receiving dividend income, on the other hand, and their different 
saving propensities.
5 Introducing interest payments into the model, profit splits into profit of 
enterprise (Π
n) and rentiers’ income (R) (equation 4).
6 Rentiers’ income is determined by the 
stock of long-term credit (B) granted to firms and the exogenously given rate of interest (i). 
Equation (5) defines the firms’ debt-capital-ratio (λ) 
 
Considering the distribution effects of interest rate variations (equation 6) we will assume that 
the mark-up is interest-inelastic in the short-run but that it is interest-elastic in the long-run.
7 
As the mark-up on variable costs has to cover the firm’s actual and imputed interest 
payments, the minimum mark-up is also affected by the interest rate. For the same reason, the 
rate of interest determines the minimum rate of profit on real investment in the long run. In 
the short run, there need not be an immediate positive impact of interest rate variations on the 
mark-up, the profit share and the profit rate, but we rather suppose a direct effect on internal 
funds of the firm and hence on investment and employment which will be discussed below. If 
                                                 
3 See for a similar procedure with respect to the introduction of monetary variables into post-Keynesian models 
of distribution and growth Lavoie (1992: 347-371, 1993, 1995), Dutt/Amadeo (1993), Dutt (1989, 1992), Taylor 
(1985, 2004: 272-278) and Hein (1999, 2006, 2006a). 
4 The distinction between short-term finance for production purposes and long-term finance for investment 
purposes, not dealt with in the present paper, can be found in the monetary circuit approach (Graziani 1989, 
1994; Lavoie 1992: 151-169; Seccareccia, 1996, 2003). 
5 Of course, our simplification implies that profits net of interest payments are all reinvested into the firm. 
6 In what follows the terms ‘profit’, ‘profit share’ and ‘profit rate’ are related to gross profits as the sum of profit 
of enterprise and interest paid to rentiers. 
7 According to Kalecki (1954: 18), the degree of monopoly, and hence the mark-up, may but need not increase 
when overhead costs, including interest costs, increase.   6
changes in the interest rate are lasting, the mark-up and the profit share will have to change in 
the same direction, because in the long run firms can only sustain those production processes 
which yield the minimum rate of profit determined by the interest rate. Note that for a long 
run effect on the mark-up and the profit share, it is a change in the interest rate and not in the 
actual interest payments which is relevant, because we assume that firms are aware of 
imputed interest costs on own capital, i.e. on accumulated retained earnings. 
 
We assume a classical saving hypothesis, i.e. labourers do not save. The part of profits 
retained is completely saved by definition. The part of profits distributed to rentiers’ 
households, i.e. the interest payment, is used by those households according to their 
propensity to save (sR). Therefore, total saving (S) comprises retained profits (Π-Z) and 
saving out of interest income (SR). Taking equations (3), (4) and (5) into account, we get the 
saving rate (σ) in equation (7) which relates total saving to the nominal capital stock.
8 Note 
that an increase in the rate of interest, ceteris paribus, decreases the saving rate because 
income is transferred from firms with a saving propensity of unity to rentiers’ households 
with a saving propensity of less than unity. An increasing debt-capital-ratio of firms reduces 
the saving rate for the same reason. 
 
Equation (8) for the accumulation rate (g), relating net investment (I) to the capital stock, 
follows the arguments in Kalecki (1954) and assumes that investment decisions are positively 
affected both by expected sales and by retained earnings.
9 Expected sales are determined by 
the rate of capacity utilisation. Retained earnings, in relation to the capital stock, are given by 
the difference between the rate of profit and the rate of interest times the debt-capital-ratio. 
Therefore, the rate of interest and the debt-capital-ratio both have a negative impact on 
investment because they adversely affect internal funds. This also limits the access to external 




The goods market equilibrium is determined by the equality of saving and investment 
decisions in equation (9). The goods market stability condition in equation (10) requires that 
                                                 
8 This saving function is similar to the one used by Lavoie (1992: 365, 1995: 160), the only difference is that we 
explicitly consider the debt-capital-ratio. 
9 On different accumulation functions in Kalecki’s work see also Steindl (1981). 
10 On Kalecki’s ‘principle of increasing risk’ see Arestis (1996) und Sawyer (1985: 101-106, 2001a). A similar 
view was taken by Robinson (1962: 86) and Steindl (1952: 107-138). Recent empirical work has shown that the 
interest rate has important effects on investment through its impacts on internal funds and hence on the access to 
external borrowing in imperfect capital markets (Fazzari et al. 1988; Hubbard 1998; Schiantarelli 1996).   7
the saving rate responds more elastically to changes in capacity utilisation than capital 
accumulation does. Note that the necessary condition for a stable equilibrium requires  1 < τ , 
which means that the effects of internal funds on investment have to be restricted in order to 
achieve a stable goods market equilibrium. The goods market equilibrium values (*) for 
capacity utilisation, capital accumulation and the rate of profit are as follows: 
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3. Employment, wage bargaining and inflation: the GERE and the SIRE 
 
With constant productivity of labour, capacity utilisation determined by the goods market 
equilibrium also determines employment (L) and with a given labour force (LF) also the 
employment rate (e = L/LF), which, in what follows, we term the ‘Goods market Equilibrium 
Rate of Employment’ (GERE). An increase in capacity utilisation is associated with a 
proportional increase in the GERE. Generally, in Kaleckian and post-Keynesian distribution 
and growth models full utilisation of productive capacity determined by the capital stock will 
not mean full employment of labour. In order to keep things as simple as possible, however, 
we will assume in what follows that the rate of capacity utilisation and the employment rate 
are equal (z = e) and that hence full utilisation of capacity is associated with full 
employment.
11 Under these conditions the rate of unemployment [u = (LF-L)/LF)] is 
determined by the rate of capacity utilisation: 
 
u 1 e z − = = .            ( 1 4 )  
                                                 
11 This simplification precludes that the size of the capital stock may have an effect on the NAIRU, as in 
Arestis/Sawyer (2004: 71-99) and Sawyer (2001, 2002).   8
 
Inflation in Kaleckian and post-Keynesian models is determined by distribution conflict.
12 
Figure 1 displays a simple ‘conflicting claims’ model of employment and inflation assuming 
constant production coefficients and a constant mark-up. 
 
<Figure 1 here> 
 
Although wage bargaining is concerned with money wage rates, it is assumed that labour 
unions intend to achieve a certain real wage rate – and with labour productivity given or 
productivity growth correctly anticipated a certain wage share. The labour unions’ target real 
wage rate (w
r
b) depends positively on the employment rate, and with our assumptions 
mentioned above therefore on the rate of capacity utilisation, because the rate of 




b ε + θ = .            ( 1 5 )  
 
At this stage we assume that unions do not consider the macroeconomic effects of their 
nominal wage demands. There is neither co-ordination between unions in different firms or 
industries nor between wage bargaining parties and monetary policy. Full employment is 
therefore associated with a union target real wage rate equal to labour productivity (y). 
Therefore, unemployment has the function to curtail distribution claims of labourers (Kalecki 
1971: 156-164). 
 
The feasible real wage rate (w
r
p) is given by mark-up pricing of firms. From equation (1) we 











.           ( 1 6 )  
 
With the simplifying assumptions of a constant coefficient technology and a constant mark-up 
up to full capacity output the feasible real wage rate curve in Figure 1 is just a horizontal line. 
The unions’ target real wage and the feasible real wage only coincide by accident. From 
                                                 
12 See Arestis/Sawyer (2004: 73-87), Cassetti (2002), Lavoie (1992: 391-421, 2002), Rowthorn (1977) and 
Sawyer (2001, 2002) for post-Keynesian models of distribution conflict and inflation.   9
equations (15) and (16), and making use of equation (2), we get for the employment rate (e
N), 
and hence the rate of capacity utilisation (z
N), which allows for the consistency of the target 
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Only if the goods market equilibrium generates an employment rate of z* = z
N, the 
distribution claims of labourers and firms will be compatible. Whenever the GERE deviates 
from z
N we get rising or falling inflation rates (and finally deflation). This can easily be 
shown as follows. Assume that wage bargaining parties determine the growth rate of nominal 
wages ( ) according to:  w ˆ
 
) z z ( y ˆ p ˆ w ˆ
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t t 1 t t − ε + + = − .          ( 1 8 )  
 
Wage inflation is therefore determined by past inflation, (correctly anticipated) productivity 
growth, the attempt to improve distribution whenever the employment rate exceeds some 
threshold, and nominal wage moderation whenever the employment rate is below this 
threshold. Price setting of firms follows wage setting by wage bargainers. It is therefore firms’ 
pricing decisions which determine distribution at any rate. From equation (1) we get for the 
inflation rate ( ):  p ˆ
 
t t t t y ˆ w ˆ ) m ˆ ( p ˆ − + + = 1 .          ( 1 9 )  
 
If firms do not vary the mark-up and productivity growth is either correctly anticipated by 
firms and labour unions, or zero, we get: 
 
NAIRU 1 z z : if only , p ˆ p ˆ
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t 1 t t − = = = − .        ( 2 0 )  
 




N] associated with this ‘Stable Inflation 
Rate of Employment’ (SIRE) may therefore be termed ‘Non Accelerating Inflation Rate of 
Unemployment’ (NAIRU). It defines a distribution equilibrium between the claims of 
labourers and those of firms.   10
4. The short run stability of the NAIRU/the SIRE 
 
Discussing the stability of the NAIRU or the SIRE we will proceed in two steps. First, we will 
consider the issue of stability without monetary policy interventions. Then, we will analyse 
the effects of monetary policy applying the interest tool whenever the GERE deviates from 
the SIRE. 
 
No monetary policy intervention 
In older New Keynesian models with an exogenous stock of money, the stability of the 
NAIRU is achieved by a real balance effect.
13 Falling (rising) nominal wage and hence price 
inflation whenever unemployment is above (below) the NAIRU is assumed not to affect 
nominal demand but only real demand. This will then bring back real demand to a level 
consistent with the NAIRU. However, as in our model the stock of money is endogenous 
Keynes and/or Pigou effects cannot work as stabilisers.  
 
Stockhammer (2004) has discussed another potential stabilisation mechanism of the NAIRU 
in a post-Keynesian distribution and growth model making use of the Bhaduri/Marglin (1990) 
distinction between wage-led and profit-led growth regimes. Following a suggestion by the 
late Kalecki (1971: 156-164) distribution is assumed to be affected by unemployment: Rising 
(falling) unemployment causes a falling (rising) wage share. Therefore, in a profit-led regime 
the NAIRU will always be stable, whereas in a wage-led regime stability depends on the 
relative adjustments of accumulation and distribution whenever unemployment deviates from 
the NAIRU. However, within a monetary economy the distribution effects of a changing 
employment rate or rate of capacity utilisation supposed by Stockhammer (2004) cannot be 
taken for granted. Of course, a rising employment rate will cause increasing nominal wage 
demands by workers. But it may also trigger rising profit claims by firms and hence rising 
mark-ups.
14 And as firms set prices in the goods markets after nominal wages have been set in 
the labour market, we could also suppose a rising profit share accompanying a rising rate of 
capacity utilisation and employment due to firms’ improved sales conditions, at least in a 
closed economy. If this is assumed, the NAIRU in Stockhammer’s (2004) model will be 
                                                 
13 See Carlin/Soskice (1990: 159-160) and Layard/Nickell/Jackman (1991: 362-64) who rely on a Keynes-effect 
within an IS-LM-framework. Blanchard/Summers (1987) take nominal demand as given and implicitly rely on a 
Pigou-effect. 
14 See Arestis/Sawyer (2004: 73-87) for a conflicting claims model with an increasing mark-up when high levels 
of capacity utilisation are achieved. See also Lavoie (1992: 391-397) for a discussion of different cases with 
respect to relative bargaining power of firms and labour unions.   11
stable in the wage-led regime, whereas in the profit-led regime stability will depend on 
relative adjustments of accumulation and distribution.  
 
We will not try to resolve this issue here and continue to assume that distribution between 
wages and gross profits is not affected by changes in the rates of capacity utilisation and 
employment. In what follows we will rather discuss a presumably more important effect in a 
credit economy: the real debt effect associated with rising/falling inflation rates which has 
already been highlighted by Fisher (1933) and by Keynes (1936: 264). 
 
Let us assume that the stock of firms’ debt is not indexed to changes in the inflation rate. 
Accelerating inflation will therefore decrease the debt-capital-ratio defined in equation (5), 
decelerating inflation will increase this ratio. If monetary policy does not respond to changes 
in the inflation rate and does not vary the nominal interest rate accordingly, real interest rates 
will fall in the face of accelerating inflation and will rise when inflation decelerates. Taken 
together, this implies that the interest-capital-ratio [iλ = (iB)/(pK) = R/(pK)] will fall when 
inflation rises and will rise when inflation falls. Given that changes in the real interest rate do 
not affect the mark-up and hence the profit share in the short run, the effects of changes in the 
interest-capital-ratio on the GERE are determined by equation (11): 
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If only stable goods market equilibria are considered, equation (11a) shows that the effects of 
changes in the interest-capital-ratio on the GERE depend on the parameters in the saving and 
investment function of the model. If the rentiers’ propensity consume (1-sR) is smaller than 
firms’ investment elasticity related to internal funds (τ), rising indebtedness and rising real 
interest payments will have a negative effect on the GERE. This can be called the ‘normal 
case’ (Lavoie 1995), usually expected in post-Keynesian theory. An increasing interest-
capital-ratio of firms will have a negative impact on the goods market equilibrium. If the 
conditions of the ‘normal case’ prevail, the SIRE will be unstable. Whenever the GERE 
exceeds the SIRE, accelerating inflation will cause falling debt-capital-ratios and falling real 
interest rates, and hence a rising GERE, moving the economy farther away from stable 
inflation. If the GERE falls short of the SIRE, decelerating inflation and finally deflation will   12
cause a rising debt-capital-ratio and rising real interest rates, and hence a falling GERE. The 
economy will be trapped in a downward spiral of disinflation/deflation, rising real 
indebtedness of the firm sector and a falling GERE. Therefore, we get a macroeconomic 
‘paradox of debt’ associated with cumulative inflation or disinflation/deflation.
15 With 
decelerating inflation and rising interest-capital-ratios, firms individually reduce investment in 
order to confine the burden of debt, with the macroeconomic effect, that disinflation or 
deflation is reinforced and the interest-capital-ratio keeps on rising. With accelerating 
inflation, firms individually will increase debt and investment, with the macroeconomic effect 
of further acceleration of inflation and a further decrease in the interest-capital-ratio. 
 
If the rentiers’ propensity consume exceeds firms’ investment elasticity with respect to 
internal funds, a rising interest-capital-ratio of firms will be associated with an increasing 
GERE. This may be called the ‘puzzling’ case (Lavoie 1995), usually not expected in post-
Keynesian theory. If the conditions of the ‘puzzling case’ prevail, the SIRE will be stable. 
Rising (falling) inflation rates will trigger falling (rising) debt-capital-ratios and falling 
(rising) real interest rates which will then cause a falling (rising) GERE.
16 The GERE will 
therefore adjust to the SIRE. 
 
Monetary policy intervention 
In our ‘normal case’, stabilising the SIRE requires monetary policy intervention applying the 
monetary interest rate tool. Also modern New Keynesian and, in particular, the New 
Consensus models rely on monetary policy to adjust actual unemployment to the NAIRU and 
to stabilise the inflation rate.
17 In these models the (real) rate of interest is the monetary policy 
instrument which implies that it is no longer assumed that monetary policy controls the stock 
of (high powered) money and that the latter is endogenous to the whole economic process 
(Arestis/Sawyer 2004: 10-72). Whenever unemployment falls short of the NAIRU and 
inflation accelerates, the central bank is supposed to increase nominal interest rates such that 
real interest rates increase, which then adversely affect aggregate demand and hence 
                                                 
15 For the macroeconomic paradox of debt in Kaleckian and post-Kaleckian distribution and growth models with 
constant prices see Lavoie (1995) and Hein (2006, 2006a). 
16 Even if we concede that in the face of accelerating inflation the behaviour of rentiers and firms may change, 
this will only temporarily inhibit the convergence process of the GERE towards the SIRE. Rentiers’ 
consumption behaviour may change and the savings propensity out rentiers’ income may decline when inflation 
accelerates. For the ‘puzzling’ case to exist, however, the savings propensity of rentiers already has to be very 
low so that there is only small room for manoeuvre. The same argument applies to the responsiveness of 
investment with respect to interest payments. 
17 For textbook-like treatments of the modern New Keynesian view see Romer (2000), Taylor (2000). For New 
Consensus models see Clarida/Gali/Gertler (1999), McCallum (2001), Meyer (2001) and Walsh (2002).    13
employment. If unemployment is below the NAIRU the central bank should lower nominal 
interest rates such that real interest rates decrease which increases aggregate demand and 
hence employment. In order to have a stable NAIRU, monetary policy interventions have to 
be symmetric and their effects have to be assumed to be symmetric as well. If these conditions 
are fulfilled, what central banks can achieve is output stabilisation in the short-run and price 
or inflation stability in the long run (Fontana/Palacio-Vera 2005).
18
 
In the ‘normal case’ in our model, however, central banks do not only have to change real 
rates of interest by means of varying the nominal rate in order to stabilise the SIRE, but the 
change in the real interest rate has to be sufficient to overcompensate the counter-effects of 
the change in the debt-capital-ratio of firms on the GERE. In general, this is not a problem in 
a situation of rising inflation, because there is no upper limit for the nominal interest rate set 
by the central bank. But in a situation of falling inflation or even deflation, central banks may 
not be able to reduce the nominal rate of interest by a sufficient amount to decrease real rates 
and to overcompensate the restrictive demand effects of rising debt-capital-ratios, because 
there is a zero lower bound for the nominal interest rate. Therefore, in this situation central 
banks may be impotent to adjust the GERE to the SIRE and the economy may be trapped in a 
deflationary recession. In the ‘normal’ case, therefore, the NAIRU can generally only be 
considered an ‘inflation barrier’ which has to be enforced by the central banks, but central 
banks may be incapable to adjust actual unemployment to the NAIRU whenever the former 
exceeds the latter. 
 
In the ‘puzzling case’, monetary policy interventions, which follow the New Keynesian/New 
Consensus advice and increase the real rate of interest in the face of rising inflation and 
decrease it in the face of falling inflation or deflation, will have a destabilising effect. This 
may overcompensate the stabilising effect exerted by the change in the debt-capital-ratio and 
may cause a further deviation of the GERE from the SIRE. Table 1 summarises our results 
with respect to short run stability of the SIRE. 
 
                                                 
18 For a more extensive discussion of the New Consensus model from a post-Keynesian view see Arestis/Sawyer 
(2004), Fontana/Palacio-Vera (2005), Lavoie (2004), Palacio-Vera (2005) and Setterfield (2004).   14
 
Table 1: The short run stability of the ‘Stable Inflation Rate of Employment’ (SIRE)
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if change in real interest rate 
overcompensates change in 




5. The long run endogeneity of the NAIRU/the SIRE 
 
The endogeneity of the NAIRU, that is the adjustment of the NAIRU to the actual rate of 
unemployment determined by the goods market in the case of a persistent deviation of the two 
rates has been discussed within New Keynesian models under the heading of ‘hysteresis’ 
(Ball 1999; Blanchard/Summers 1987). Applying union wage bargaining or insider-outsider 
models, persistent unemployment and an increasing share of long-term unemployment in total 
unemployment with the associated loss of skills and access to firms by the long-term 
unemployed will decrease the pressure of a given rate of unemployment on labour unions’ or 
insiders’ target real wage and hence on nominal wage demands. The labour unions’ target real 
wage curve in Figure 1 will rotate upwards (ε in equations (15), (17) and (18) will increase), 
the SIRE will decline, and the NAIRU will increase. 
 
Arestis/Sawyer (2004: 73-99) and Sawyer (2001, 2002) have discussed another source of 
endogeneity of the NAIRU: the effect of current investment on capital stock and productivity 
growth.
19 Whereas investment in the short run determines effective demand and hence the 
GERE, net investment also increases the capital stock and therefore affects maximum 
employment if this is restrained by the capital stock. And it also affects the NAIRU or the 
SIRE if it is assumed that firms increase the mark-up when actual output approaches full 
capacity output. In order to simplify our model we have excluded this by means of assuming a 
constant mark-up and full utilisation of capital stock being associated with full employment. 
However, in the real world this is not necessarily the case and Arestis and Sawyer have 
                                                 
19 See also Arestis/Baddeley/Sawyer (2006), Arestis/Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal (2000) and Rowthorn (1995, 
1999).   15
therefore made an important point: Low investment does not only cause a low GERE but also 
decreases the SIRE by restraining the capital stock and output capacity. But investment does 
not only affect the size of the capital stock, it also affects productivity growth if we assume 
that technical progress is embodied in physical investment and/or that there are increasing 
returns to scale.
20 In our model, increasing productivity (growth) will shift the firms’ target 
real wage curve in Figure 1 downwards and the SIRE in equation (17) will increase. This, 
however, supposes that labour unions do not adjust their target real wage rate when 
productivity growth increases. But this cannot be taken for granted, if labour unions target a 
certain wage share and can correctly anticipate productivity growth as we have assumed in 
equation (18). If this is the case, productivity growth will have no effect on the SIRE or the 
NAIRU. From this it follows, that the effect of productivity growth on the NAIRU depends on 
labour unions’ or workers’ aspirations to participate in increasing productivity. 
 
In what follows we will trace another source of endogeneity which is associated with the 
distributional effects of monetary policy responses to accelerating or decelerating inflation 
rates. Assume for the reasons given above that persistent changes in the real interest rate are 
in the long-run accompanied by changes in the mark-up in the same direction. In our model 
this has two effects: 
First, changes in the mark-up affect the firms’ target real wage rate: An increasing (a 
decreasing) mark-up shifts the firms’ target real wage curve in Figure 1 downwards (upwards) 
and the SIRE decreases (increases). From equation (17) we get for the effect of a change in 
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Second, changes in the mark-up and thus in distribution between wages and gross profits have 
an additional effect on the goods market equilibrium and hence on the GERE. From equation 
(11) we get: 
                                                 
20 The productivity enhancing effects of investment in capital stock is pointed out in demand-led growth models. 
See Dutt (2003, 2005), Kaldor (1957), Leon-Ledesma/Thirlwall (2002), and the papers in Setterfield (2002). 
Growth is primarily demand-driven because labour force and productivity growth respond to demand. This view 
has been applied by Lavoie (2004) in his post-Keynesian alternative to the New Consensus models in which the 

















,         (11b) 
 
The effect of a change in the mark-up and in the profit share on the GERE is negative. Raising 
the mark-up when interest rates increase will have a positive impact on firms’ internal funds 
but will simultaneously reduce consumption demand, sales and hence capacity utilisation (and 
the GERE) which will then negatively feed back on internal funds. Furthermore, lower 
capacity utilisation will also have a negative impact on investment decisions. 
 
Let us now discuss the implications for the effects of monetary policy interventions. We start 
with the ‘normal’ case from Table 1. Assume that the GERE exceeds the initial SIRE at z
N
1 in 
Figure 2. Since accelerating inflation and a falling interest-capital-ratio of firms is a stimulus 
for effective demand, the GERE will further increase and inflation acceleration will speed up. 
In order to stabilise the rate of inflation, central banks have to increase nominal interest rates 
in order to raise real interest rates by a sufficient amount to overcompensate the demand 
stimulating effects of falling debt-capital-ratios. Therefore, in the short-run the central bank 
can bring back the GERE to the SIRE at z
N
1. In the long run, however, a higher real interest 





p2 and reduce the SIRE to z
N
2. The redistribution at the expense of labour 
will also reduce the GERE. Three scenarios are possible depending on the relative effects of 
changes in distribution on the GERE and on the SIRE in equations (11b) and (17a). 
 











, the reduction of the GERE caused by an increasing mark-up will 
make this new rate coincide with the SIRE at z
N













, the effective demand effect of redistribution at the expense of labour will 
make the GERE fall below z
N
2 and we get falling inflation rates. This should then make 
monetary policies reduce real interest rates, making the GERE increase to z
N
2 in the short run. 
In the long run, firms then reduce mark-ups, the firms’ target real wage curve shifts upwards, 
effective demand is stimulated by redistribution in favour of labour. The SIRE as well as the 
GERE increase, with the latter now overshooting the former and monetary policy has to   17




1, but may 
also generate stable oscillation around that SIRE or the oscillation may even explode, 
depending on the degree of over- and undershooting of the GERE with respect to the SIRE 
and the concomitant change in the real interest rate required for the short-run adjustment of 












, the effective demand effect of redistribution at the expense of labour is 
weak so that the GERE remains above z
N
2. Again we get accelerating inflation inducing the 
central bank to increase real interest rates, forcing the GERE down to z
N
2 in the short run. In 
the long run, firms again increase mark-ups, which shifts their target real wage curve down to 
w
r
p3 and the SIRE declines to z
N
3. The GERE also declines because of the redistribution of 
income at the expense of labour but remains above z
N
3, inflation accelerates anew and central 
banks have to intervene again. 
 
Equation (11b) shows that the effective demand effect of redistribution between wages and 
gross profits becomes weaker when the GERE decreases. This implies that a continuous 
development along scenario 3 becomes the more likely the lower the GERE declines. This is 
shown in Figure 2: The long run ‘Phillips-curve’, that is the rate of employment - or the rate 
of unemployment - which stabilises the inflation rate (at whatever level), becomes horizontal 
because of the nature of monetary policy interventions.
21 In this scenario, monetary policy is 
only able to stabilise the inflation rate in the long run at the expense of a continuously 
decreasing GERE, because monetary policy interventions trigger a process in which 
stabilising inflation in the short run by means of increasing real interest rates and slowing 
down the economy reestablishes the inflation problem in the long run when the full 
distribution effects of real interest rate variations are felt. In the long run, this scenario 
describes a latent tendency towards stagflation. 
 
<Figure 2 here> 
 
Note that scenario 3 also works in reverse: If the central bank intends to improve the GERE, 
in the short run lowering real interest rates will be associated with accelerating inflation. In 
                                                 
21 Our argument is different from Freedman/Harcourt/Kriesler’s (2004) who also derive a horizontal long-run 
Phillips-curve. They use the labour market hysteresis argument: In order to keep inflation down, a certain 
amount of short-term unemployment is required irrespective of long-term unemployment. But as short-term 
unemployed in the process of time inevitably become long-term unemployed, the total rate of unemployment 
required to stabilise inflation has to increase.   18
the long run however, a falling mark-up increases the SIRE. And since the demand effect of 
redistribution in favour of labour is not too strong so that the GERE does not exceed the 
SIRE, there is again room for manoeuvre for the central bank to cut real interest rates. 
 
Let us now briefly discuss the short-run ‘puzzling’ case from Table 1. In this case a deviation 
of the GERE from the SIRE is self correcting in the short run without monetary policy 
intervention. If the GERE exceeds z
N
1 in Figure 2, the reduction in consumption demand 
caused by the devaluation of rentiers’ assets will overcompensate the stimulation of firms’ 
investment demand caused by a falling interest-capital-ratio. If central banks simply hold the 





If, however, central banks try to fight accelerating inflation rates by means of increasing the 
real interest rate as recommended by the New Keynesian and the New Consensus models, 
they will delay the convergence process towards z
N
1 in the short run.
22 The long run effect of 
an increasing real interest rate will reduce the SIRE to z
N
2. This will again accelerate inflation. 
The redistribution at the expense of labour caused by an increasing mark-up, however, will 
have a dampening effect on the GERE shifting it towards z
N
2. Again, we have three scenarios 
depending on the relative effects of changes in distribution on the GERE and on the SIRE 
(equations (11b) and (17a)):  











, the GERE will coincide with z
N
2 and the economy will get to rest 












, the GERE falls below z
N
2 and we will get disinflation, short-run real 
interest rate cuts delaying the convergence process towards z
N
2 which will in the long run 
decrease the mark-up moving the SIRE upwards. Redistribution in favour of labour stimulates 
demand and employment and makes the GERE exceed the SIRE, etc.. The outcome of this 
process again depends on the degree of over- and undershooting of the GERE with respect to 
the SIRE and on the degree of (now disturbing) monetary policy interventions. 
                                                 
22 Of course, central banks raising the real interest rates may also prevent the adjustment process as we have 












, the redistribution effect at the expense of labour income on demand is 
weak, the GERE will remain higher than z
N
2. Inflation will accelerate, central banks will 
increase real interest rates disturbing the short run convergence process towards z
N
2 and 




Since the effective demand effect of redistribution between wages and gross profits becomes 
weaker when the employment rate goes down (equation (11b)), we get again that scenario 3 
becomes the more likely the lower the GERE becomes: The long run ‘Phillips-curve’ 
becomes again horizontal, as in Figure 2. 
 
Let us finally add that, whatever case we consider and whatever scenario comes into 
existence, in the long run the SIRE and hence the NAIRU are endogenous to monetary 
policy’s real interest rate manipulation in our model. Therefore, in our approach the NAIRU 
is a direct result of monetary policy interventions. 
 
 
6. Results and implications for monetary policy and wage bargaining 
 
In a Kaleckian distribution and growth model with endogenous money and inflation generated 
by distribution conflict we have shown that monetary policy is either an unnecessary or a 
costly tool to control inflation in the short run. Taking into account the real debt effects of 
inflation acceleration or deceleration, the NAIRU will be stable in the ‘puzzling’ case with a 
propensity to consume out of rentiers’ income exceeding the sensitivity of investment with 
respect to internal funds. Inflation targeting monetary policies raising real interest rates in the 
face of accelerating inflation will disturb adjustment to stable inflation rates in this case. In 
the ‘normal’ case of a rentiers’ propensity to consume falling short of firms’ elasticity of 
investment with respect to internal funds, the NAIRU will be unstable. Inflation targeting 
monetary policies applying the interest rate tool will be able to contain accelerating inflation. 
There are, however, some doubts whether monetary policies will be able to fight decelerating 
inflation and finally deflation because there is a zero bound for the nominal interest rate. In 
this case, therefore, the NAIRU is merely an ‘inflation barrier’ enforced by monetary policies, 
but there is no guarantee that monetary policies will always be able to adjust unemployment   20
determined by the goods market to the NAIRU, as is assumed in New Keynesian or New 
Consensus models.  
 
In the long run, variations in the real interest rate will affect the firms’ target real wage rate 
and the NAIRU becomes endogenous to monetary policy. This direct channel of endogeneity 
supplements those channels already discussed in the literature: labour market hysteresis and 
capital stock effects on the NAIRU. In the ‘normal’ as well as in the ‘puzzling’ case, inflation 
targeting monetary policies raising the real interest rate in the face of accelerating inflation 
will raise the NAIRU. This bears the risk of a continuously increasing NAIRU in order to 
keep inflation under control, which may yield a horizontal long run Phillips-curve and latent 
stagflation. Taking these effects into account, monetary policy raising real interest rates can 
be considered an inappropriate tool to control inflation in the long run.  
 
According to our analysis, monetary policy should rather aim at low real interest rates in the 
short and in the long run. This allows for a long run increase in the SIRE and hence a 
reduction in the NAIRU, in any case. In the ‘puzzling’ case, lower real interest rates will 
decrease the GERE in the short run, but the real debt effects associated with disinflation will 
finally adjust the GERE to the higher SIRE in the long run. In the ‘normal’ case, lowering real 
interest rates will increase the GERE in the short run which might trigger acceleration of 
inflation. This, however, will be dampened or even be wiped out as soon as the long run 
increase in the SIRE becomes effective. 
 
If short run accelerating inflation in the face of an increasing GERE is to be avoided, the 
causes of inflation should directly be addressed. Therefore, policy makers should resort to 
wage bargaining co-ordination as an appropriate tool. As recent research on the interaction of 
independent central banks and wage bargaining institutions has shown, effectively co-
ordinated wage bargaining is able to internalise negative macroeconomic wage externalities 
(Franzese 2001, 2001a; Hein 2002, 2004): In economies with a high degree of ‘effective’ 
wage bargaining co-ordination, the reduction of inflation rates has been accompanied by less 
employment losses than in economies with a low degree of co-ordination. Effective wage 
bargaining co-ordination is characterised by a high degree of horizontal bargaining co-
ordination between industries (pattern bargaining, state imposed or sponsored co-ordination, 
intra-associational co-ordination, etc.). In order to solve the implementation problem of 
collective agreements and to prevent wage dumping or positive wage drift, ‘effective’   21
bargaining co-ordination also has to include a high degree of vertical co-ordination within 
industries (high level of union and bargaining agreement coverage, legal enforceability of 
collective agreements, peace obligations, etc.) (Kittel/Traxler 2001). The influence of 
effective co-ordination of wage bargaining on the SIRE in our model is shown in Figure 3. 
 
<Figure 3 here> 
 









2 the bargaining parties are able to accept the feasible 
real wage and to exhaust the scope for distribution, taking into account the inflation objective 
of the central banks. By means of effectively co-ordinated wage bargaining a constant 
inflation rate becomes compatible with a range of GEREs. The SIRE or the NAIRU as the 
short run limit to employment are no longer unique. Contrary to prevailing propositions, in 
our Kaleckian approach a reduction of the NAIRU and an increase in the SIRE can be 
attained by means of organising the labour market and co-ordinating the bargaining parties, 
and does not require decentralisation of wage bargaining and deregulation of labour markets, 
as in New Keynesian or New Consensus models. A high degree of effective wage bargaining 
co-ordination should also have the additional virtue that increasing unemployment will not 
cause immediate disinflation or deflation with its potentially negative impacts on effective 





Arestis, P. (1996): Kalecki’s role in post Keynesian economics: An overview, in: King, J.E. (ed.), An 
Alternative Macroeconomic Theory: The Kaleckian Model and Post-Keynesian Economics, 
Boston: Kluiwer. 
Arestis, P., Baddeley, M., Sawyer, M. (2006): Is capital stock a determinant of unemployment?, in: 
Hein, E., Heise, A., Truger, A. (eds.), Wages, Employment, Distribution and Growth. International 
Perspectives, Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan, forthcoming. 
Arestis, P., Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal, I. (2000): Capital stock, unemployment and wages in the UK 
and Germany, in: Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 47, pp. 487-503. 
Arestis, P., Sawyer, M. (2004): Re-examining Monetary and Fiscal Policy for the 21
st Century, 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Ball, L. (1999): Aggregate demand and long-run unemployment, in: Brooking Papers on Economic 
Activity, 2, pp. 189-251. 
Ball, L., Mankiw, N.G. (2002): The NAIRU in theory and practice, in: Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Vol. 16(4), pp. 115-136.   22
Bhaduri, A., Marglin, S. (1990): Unemployment and the real wage: the economic basis for contesting 
political ideologies, in: Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 14, pp. 375-393. 
Blanchard, O., Katz, L.F. (1997): What we know and do not know about the natural rate of unemploy-
ment, in: Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 11 (1), pp. 51-72. 
Blanchard, O., Summers, L.H. (1987): Hysteresis in Unemployment, in: European Economic Review, 
Vol. 31, pp. 288-295. 
Blanchard, O., Summers, L.H. (1988): Why is unemployment so high in Europe?, in: American 
Economic Review, Vol. 78, pp. 182-187. 
Carlin, W., Soskice, D. (1990): Macroeconomics and the Wage Bargain. A Modern Approach to 
Employment, Inflation and the Exchange Rate, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Cassetti, M. (2002): Conflict, inflation, distribution and terms of trade in the Kaleckian model, in: 
Setterfield, M. (ed.), The Economics of Demand-led Growth, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Clarida, R., Gali, J., Gertler, M. (1999): The science of monetary policy: a New Keynesian 
perspective, in: Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 37, pp. 1661-1707. 
Davidson, P. (1998): The macroeconomics of OECD unemployment, in: The Economic Journal, Vol. 
108, pp. 817-831. 
Dutt, A.K. (1989): Accumulation, distribution and inflation in a Marxian/post-Keynesian model with a 
rentier class, in: Review of Radical Political Economics, Vol. 21 (3), pp. 18-26. 
Dutt, A.K. (1992): Rentiers in post-Keynesian models, in: Arestis P., Chick V. (eds.), Recent 
Developments in Post-Keynesian Economics, Aldershot: Edward Elgar. 
Dutt, A.K. (2003): New growth theory, effective demand, and post-Keynesian dynamics, in: 
Salvadori, N. (ed.), Old and New Growth Theories: An Assessment, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Dutt, A.K. (2005): Aggregate demand, aggregate supply and economic growth, Paper presented at the 
conference “Understanding Economic Growth: New Directions in Theory and Policy”, Downing 
College, Cambridge/UK, September 1-3, 2005. 
Dutt, A.K., Amadeo, E.J. (1993): A post-Keynesian theory of growth, interest and money, in: 
Baranzini M., Harcourt G. (eds.), The Dynamics of the Wealth of Nations, London: Macmillan. 
Fazzari, S.M., Hubbard, R.G., Petersen, B.C. (1988): Financing constraints and corporate investment, 
in: Brooking Papers on Economic Activity, 1, pp. 141-195. 
Fisher, I. (1933): The debt-deflation theory of great depressions, in: Econometrica, Vol. 1, pp. 337-
357. 
Fontana, G., Palacio-Vera, A. (2005): Are long-run price stability and short-run output stabilization all 
that monetary policy can aim for?, Paper presented at the 31
st Annual Conference of the Eastern 
Economic Association, New York. 
Franzese, R.J. (2001): Institutions and sectoral interactions in monetary policy and wage/price-
bargaining, in: Hall, P.A., Soskice, D. (eds.), Varieties of Capitalism. Institutional Foundations of 
Comparative Advantage, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Franzese, R.J. (2001a): Strategic interaction of monetary policymakers and wage/price bargainers: a 
review with implications for the European common-currency area, in: Empirica, Vol. 28, pp. 457-
486. 
Freedman, C., Harcourt, G.C., Kriesler, P. (2004): Has the long-run Phillips Curve turned horizontal?, 
in: Argyrous, G., Forstater, M., Mongiovi, G. (eds.), Growth, Distribution, and Effective Demand. 
Alternatives to the Orthodoxy. Essays in Honor of Edward J. Nell, Armonk, New York: M.E. 
Sharpe. 
Galbraith, J.K. (1997): Time to ditch the NAIRU, in: Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 11 (1), 
pp. 93-108.   23
Graziani, A. (1989): The theory of the monetary circuit, in: Thames Papers in Political Economy, 
Spring. 
Graziani, A. (1994): Monetary circuits, in: Arestis P., Sawyer M. (eds.), The Elgar Companion to 
Radical Political Economy, Aldershot: Edward Elgar. 
Hein, E. (1999): Interest rates, income shares and investment in a Kaleckian model, in: Political 
Economy. Review of Political Economy and Social Sciences, Issue 5, pp. 5-22. 
Hein, E. (2002): Monetary policy and wage bargaining in the EMU: restrictive ECB policies, high 
unemployment, nominal wage restraint and inflation above the target, in: Banca Nazionale del 
Lavoro Quarterly Review, Vol. 55, pp. 299-337. 
Hein, E. (2004): Die NAIRU – eine post-keynesianische Interpretation, in: Intervention. Zeitschrift für 
Ökonomie, Vol. 1, pp. 43-66. 
Hein, E. (2006): Interest rate, debt, distribution and capital accumulation in a post-Kaleckian model, 
in: Metroeconomica, forthcoming. 
Hein, E. (2006a): Interest rate, debt and capital accumulation - a Kaleckian approach, in: International 
Review of Applied Economics, forthcoming.
Hubbard, R.G. (1998): Capital-market-imperfections and investment, in: Journal of Economic 
Literature, Vol. 36, pp. 193-225. 
Kaldor, N. (1957): A model of economic growth, in: The Economic Journal, Vol. 67, pp. 591-624. 
Kaldor, N. (1970): The new monetarism, in: Lloyds Bank Review, No. 97 (July), pp. 1-17. 
Kaldor, N. (1982): The Scourge of Monetarism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kaldor, N. (1985): How monetarism failed, in: Challenge, May/June, pp. 4-13. 
Kalecki, M. (1937): The principle of increasing risk, in: Economica, Vol. 4, pp. 440-447. 
Kalecki, M. (1954): Theory of Economic Dynamics, London: George Allen. 
Kalecki, M. (1971): Selected Essays on the Dynamics of the Capitalist Economy, 1933-70, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Keynes, J.M. (1936): The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, in: The Collected 
Writings of J.M. Keynes, Vol. VII, 1973, London, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Kittel, B., Traxler, F. (2001): Lohnverhandlungssysteme und Geldpolitik, in: Wirtschaft und 
Gesellschaft, Vol. 27, pp. 11-40. 
Lavoie, M. (1984): The endogenous flow of credit and the post-Keynesian theory of money, in: 
Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 18, pp. 771-797. 
Lavoie, M. (1992): Foundations of Post Keynesian Economic Analysis, Aldershot: Edward Elgar. 
Lavoie, M. (1993): A post-classical view of money, interest, growth and distribution, in: Mongiovi, 
G., Rühl, C. (eds.), Macroeconomic Theory: Diversity and Convergence, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Lavoie, M. (1995): Interest rates in post-Keynesian models of growth and distribution, in: 
Metroeconomica, Vol. 46, pp. 146-177. 
Lavoie, M. (1996): Horizontalism, structuralism, liquidity preference and the principle of increasing 
risk, in: Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 43, pp. 275-300. 
Lavoie, M. (1996a): Traverse, hysteresis and normal rates of capacity utilization in Kaleckian models 
of growth and distribution, in: Review of Radical Political Economics, Vol. 28, pp. 113-147. 
Lavoie, M. (2002): The Kaleckian growth model with target return pricing and conflict inflation, in: 
Setterfield, M. (ed.), The Economics of Demand-led Growth, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Lavoie, M. (2004): The New Consensus on monetary policy seen from a Post-Keynesian perspective, 
in: Lavoie, M., Seccareccia, M. (eds.), Central Banking in the Modern World. Alternative 
Perspectives, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.   24
Layard, R., Nickell, S., Jackman, R. (1991): Unemployment. Macroeconomic Performance and the 
Labour Market, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Leon-Ledesma, M.A., Thirlwall, A.P. (2002): The endogeneity of the natural rate of growth, in: 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 26, pp. 441-459. 
Mankiw, N.G. (2001): The inexorable and mysterious tradeoff between inflation and unemployment, 
in: The Economic Journal, Vol. 111, pp. C45-C61. 
McCallum, B. (2001): Monetary policy analysis in models without money, in: Federal Reserve Bank 
of St. Louis Review, Vol. 83 (4), pp. 145-160 
Meyer, L.H. (2001): Does money matter?, in: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, Vol. 83 (5), 
pp. 1-15. 
Moore, B.J. (1988): Horizontalists and Verticalists: The Macroeconomics of Credit Money, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Moore, B.J. (1989): The endogeneity of credit money, in: Review of Political Economy, Vol. 1, pp. 
65-93. 
Palacio-Vera, A. (2005): The ‘modern’ view of macroeconomics: some critical reflections, in: 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, forthcoming. 
Pasinetti, L.L. (1974): Growth and Income Distribution, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Robinson, J. (1962): Essays in the Theory of Economic Growth, London, New York: Macmillan. 
Romer, D. (2000): Keynesian macroeconomics without the LM curve, in: Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Vol. 14 (2), pp. 149-169. 
Rowthorn, R.E. (1977): Conflict, inflation and money, in: Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 1, 
pp. 215-239. 
Rowthorn, R.E. (1995): Capital formation and unemployment, in: Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 
Vol. 11(1), pp. 26-39. 
Rowthorn, R.E. (1999): Unemployment, wage bargaining and capital-labour substitution, in: 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 23, pp. 413-425. 
Sawyer, M. (1985): The Economics of Michal Kalecki, Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe. 
Sawyer, M. (2001): The NAIRU: a critical appraisal, in: Arestis, P., Sawyer, M. (ed.), Money, Finance 
and Capitalist Development, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Sawyer, M. (2001a): Kalecki on money and finance, in: European Journal of the History of Economic 
Thought, Vol. 8, pp. 487-508. 
Sawyer, M. (2002): The NAIRU, aggregate demand and investment, in: Metroeconomica, Vol. 53, pp. 
66-94. 
Schiantarelli, F. (1996): Financial constraints and investment: methodological issues and international 
evidence, in: Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 12, pp. 70-89. 
Seccareccia, M. (1996): Post Keynesian fundism and monetary circulation, in: Deleplace, G., Nell, E. 
(eds.), Money in Motion, London: Macmillan. 
Seccareccia, M. (2003): Pricing, investment and the financing of production within the framework of 
the monetary circuit: some preliminary evidence, in: Rochon L.-P., Rossi S. (eds.), Modern 
Theories of Money, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Setterfield, M. (2004): Central banking, stability and macroeconomic outcomes: a comparison of New 
Consensus and Post-Keynesian monetary macroeconomics, in: Lavoie, M., Seccareccia, M. (eds.), 
Central Banking in the Modern World. Alternative Perspectives, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Setterfield, M. (ed.) (2002): The Economics of Demand-led Growth. Challenging the Supply-side 
Vision of the Long Run, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.   25
Steindl, J. (1952): Maturity and Stagnation in American Capitalism, 2nd. edition, New York, London: 
Monthly Review Press, 1976. 
Steindl, J. (1981): Some comments on the three versions of Kalecki’s theory of the trade cycle, in: 
Lois, J. (ed.), Studies in Economic Theory and Practice, Amsterdam et al.: Elsevier. 
Stiglitz, J. (1997): Reflections on the natural rate hypothesis, in: Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
Vol. 11, pp. 3-10. 
Stockhammer, E. (2004): Is there an equilibrium rate of unemployment in the long run?, in: 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 16, pp. 59-77. 
Taylor, J.B. (2000): Teaching modern macroeconomics at the principles level, in: American Economic 
Review, Vol. 90 (2), pp. 90-94. 
Taylor, L. (1985): A stagnationist model of economic growth, in: Cambridge Journal of Economics, 
Vol. 9, pp. 383-403. 
Taylor, L. (2004): Reconstructing Macroeconomics. Structuralists Proposals and Critiques of the 
Mainstream, Cambridge/Mass, London: Harvard University Press. 
Walsh, C.E. (2002): Teaching inflation targeting: an analysis for intermediate macro, in: Journal of 
Economic Education, Vol. 33, pp. 333-346.   26
























   27
Figure 2: Long run endogeneity of the Stable Inflation Rate of Employment (SIRE) 
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